

# **Engendering Greater Citizen Rights in CAMPFIRE: A Double Edged Sword? Some Reflections from the Case Study of Hurungwe**

**Abstract of Paper by Admos O Chimhowu**  
Institute for Development Policy and Management  
University of Manchester

When the Communal Areas Management Programme for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE) was formulated in the late 1980s it was seen as introducing a compendium of rights related to making a living from the management of wildlife resources by local communities. Since the mid-1990s questions have been asked about the nature and form of citizen rights (if any) that the CAMPFIRE model engenders. Specific questions have centred on whether there was adequate devolution of authority to enhance community participation above the level of Arnstein's tokenism. This paper looks at CAMPFIRE ten years on through a case study of Hurungwe district in Zimbabwe. It shows that to some, CAMPFIRE was able to: develop new skills and knowledge (district level bureaucratic and village elites); provide limited mitigation against some covariate risks in a generally neglected frontier region; and, more crucially provide a platform to demand accountability from elected leadership. To others, CAMPFIRE is resented as synonymous with 'usurped' rights to make a living (evicted 'squatters' and victims of wildlife damage). The paper argues with some specific examples that the exercise of citizen power can be a double-edged sword. While benefiting some, for others it has trampled on their rights to make a living. While enhancing participation and accountability, the practice of the same citizen power is potentially detrimental to wildlife conservation. The paper concludes that although there are still unresolved tensions in the CAMPFIRE model, not least a shared understanding of the nature and place of citizenship rights and the final end state of devolved wildlife management, the core principles and founding values of CAMPFIRE are still ideals to strive for.

## **Introduction**

About 60km southwest of Magunje (the administrative centre for Hurungwe District), is the frontier region of 'Point Four'. So named because of the Trypanosomiasis Control Programme that had marked several points along the fly belt, this frontier settlement today signifies a different battle. Just a decade ago the fight was to make the area suitable for human habitation by clearing it of wildlife and the tsetse fly. The struggle now has been to control and stop human settlements in this frontier area all in the name of what Hulme and Murphree (2000) have termed the 'new conservation'. A high point in this struggle came in June 1997 when, after obtaining and serving eviction orders, the responsible authority, in this case the Rural District Council moved in to effect the evictions. 71 families who had been declared squatters (illegal settlers) had their homes burnt to the ground. The 'squatter families' and their belongings were loaded onto lorries and dumped just outside Karoi. Those that had heeded eviction warnings had melted back into the community only to open another frontier further west once the dust had settled.

The eviction was the climax in a battle that is being repeated with increasing frequency in a majority of the 38 Rural District Councils that are implementing wildlife management programmes (see for example Alexander and McGregor, 2000; Murombedzi, 2000; Dzingirai, 1998; Patel, 1997; Chenga, 1995; 1994). Evictions of the so called 'illegal settlers' are an enduring metaphor of the land use struggles being waged in what could be called the 'onion ring crescent' of CAMPFIRE districts. In theory, decentralisation is supposed to enhance accountability and responsiveness but in cases where devolution is to the district, local communities' the power of recall has to contend with a powerful collection of interests that develop. As Hulme and Turner (1998) argued, decentralisation is very strong on theory and short on practice. Could the eviction of these families and the whole struggle at the frontier reflect growing vernacular challenges to emerging regional discursive practices on decentralised wildlife management?

Further, does the fact that the 'Sabhukus' (local traditional leaders) continue to allocate land in areas designated by the Rural District Councils as CAMPFIRE zones, reflect a silent power struggle between a revenue seeking and therefore conveniently pro-conservation and bio-centric council and an enduring pro-development and anthropocentric traditional institution? These important questions are increasingly begging answers as CAMPFIRE 's honeymoon period comes to an end after a decade of existence. Its success as a counter narrative to arable agriculture based livelihoods in the semi-arid zones will depend on the successful resolution of these struggles in the frontier.


This paper seeks to consider through a case study of Hurungwe District this blind side of devolved wildlife management in Zimbabwe and attempts to situate the forced eviction of 'squatter families' and court battles within the realm of the unfinished business of devolution. The paper is based on a review of secondary information on CAMPFIRE in Hurungwe, interviews with villagers and key informants, and observation during fieldwork in the district from September to December 2000. Most of the fieldwork was done in Rengwe (Wards 15) and Nyamakate (Ward 8) although discussions and contacts with the CAMPFIRE Unit enables generalisations to be made where possible. Before discussing the case of Hurungwe in detail, we take a cursory look at the CAMPFIRE programme in general. It is not intended to give an elaborate description of CAMPFIRE because this has already been done in sufficient detail elsewhere.<sup>(see for example Martin 1986; Zimbabwe Trust 1990; Murphree 1991; Metcalfe 1994;)</sup>

## Origins and Nature of CAMPFIRE

Decentralised wildlife management in Zimbabwe has been in operation even before independence in 1980. Through the 1975 Parks and Wildlife Act, private landowners were included as ‘appropriate authority’ for wildlife resources in the country alongside the Forestry Commission and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management. 1982 amendments to the act extended the same privilege to the reconstituted District Councils. Rather than being automatic, the legal status of appropriate authority is given to councils that satisfy government of their capacity to manage wildlife. It was not until 1989 that the first two districts were granted appropriate authority (Metcalf, 1991).

Through the appropriate status, councils become the responsible authority for wildlife and remain accountable to government. Appropriate authority status can be taken back if council does not manage the wildlife well (Metcalf et al, 1995). In Arnstein (1969)’s typology of participation, it could be said that CAMPFIRE is a little beyond tokenism in operation.

**Arnstein’s Ladder of Citizen Participation**




To implement the devolved management, councils have sought to work with communities where the wildlife exists. These have been termed producer communities. CAMPFIRE therefore operationalises the concept of devolved authority to manage wildlife in communal areas. A portion of earnings from Safari hunting and other wildlife ventures is given back to the community as dividends. There are variations across the various districts with respect to earning capacity but generally close to 90 per cent of all revenue is earned from large game safari hunting. For lobbying purposes the CAMPFIRE Association run by a board of directors composed representatives of all the stakeholders in the industry has been formed. All CAMPFIRE districts are members of this association, which increasingly is the focal point for most CAMPFIRE policy decisions.

From this brief introduction, two important points pertinent to this discussion need to be isolated. Firstly, that CAMPFIRE originates from an inherently pro-conservation and bio-centric policy network or discourse coalition in the wildlife policy establishment. It is a strategy to create a wildlife industry acceptable to the local communities. There can therefore be no pretence that CAMPFIRE will be anthropocentric in the main. A second point relates to the level of devolution. Devolving CAMPFIRE to the Rural District Council implies accountability on the part of council to central government but not necessarily to the local communities. The extent to which communities have the power of recall remains debatable but it is hoped in this paper to argue that while the dominant role played by council limits this possibility, there are vernacular ways in which this is being done. We now turn to the case study of CAMPFIRE Hurungwe Rural District Council.

### **Hurungwe District**

Located some 240km north West of Harare, Hurungwe District is part of Mashonaland West Province of Zimbabwe. It is one of a constellation of 42 CAMPFIRE districts forming an onion ring shaped Wildlife/human settlement frontier in Zimbabwe. Map 1 shows its relative location in North West Zimbabwe. Administratively Hurungwe has 17 wards. Ten of these are communal, two are resettlement, and one is small scale commercial farming, while four are large-scale commercial farming wards. This composition makes Hurungwe a unique district in that it has all the land use categories that exist in rural Zimbabwe.

## Map 1 Relative Location Map of Hurungwe District in Zimbabwe



### Human Settlement in Hurungwe

The district has a relatively recent history of intensive human settlement. The communal land component was only established from the 1940's to resettle families displaced by intensive enforcement of the Land Apportionment Act after the Second World War. Some families like those found in Rengwe were moved under the same Act although in actual fact they were being displaced by the Kariba Dam (DNC, 1958:1). Human settlement has therefore been intensifying initially at a slower pace in the pre-independence period in spite of tacit encouragement by authorities who wanted to keep pushing the tsetse further into the Zambezi Valley. In the post independence people however, there was a massive influx of people into the district that still attracts immigrants. Population density has risen steadily from 14.4 people/km<sup>2</sup> in 1981 to 19.38 by 1992 to an estimated 23.1people/km<sup>2</sup> in 1997 (CSO 1998).

Up to 1989 when CAMPFIRE came into existence, the dominant development narrative was that arable agriculture would be the main activity in the district, which boasts some of the most fertile communal land soils in the country. Since 1989 however, CAMPFIRE has emerged as a counter narrative to arable agriculture. From 1987, by council resolution, the district was declared full. This meant that no more immigrants were to be accepted to settle in the district. Council as the land authority however has found it difficult to enforce this council resolution. In the absence of an enduring policing mechanism, the Sabhukus have continued allocating land. This has resulted in an accumulation of families that are known to the Sabhuku but have no legal recognition from the council. From time to time, council moves in to evict these people. In the case of Hurungwe districts this has happened over 537 households.

But how do these people find themselves in the area? Provisions of two acts determine this process. A permit to reside, cultivate and use communal resources is issued by the council in terms of Section 8(1) of the Communal Lands Act Number 20 of 1982 and the RDC Act Chapter 29: 13 of 1988. Ideally, an immigrant into an area approaches a sabhuku with a request for land to settle on. If land is available, the sabhuku allocates land with the chief or headman's concurrence. The person is then given a letter that introduces him to the councillor and the council. All being well, the person is then admitted into the district and begins to formally change registration details. This is in effect renouncing any other claims to communal land in the area of origin. The immigrant is given a new national identity number and is legally bound to pay dues to the council and to exercise other democratic rights like voting. No cash payments are necessary legally in the process but cases of corrupt sabhukus exacting their own gifts are not unknown. In the past it was tradition to give the chief 'badza' (a hoe) as a token of subservience to his authority. This could take any form from cash, beast, service etc. At present, what gift is given is a closely guarded secret as no sabhuku or chief will agree to having accepted it. It's only from the giver that such information is available.

In the case of Hurungwe however, the fact that the council declared the district closed to immigrants has not stopped immigrants moving in or other people from within the district moving into the frontier zones. The sabhukus collect development levies which council accepts although legally these are squatters. These people also vote in national and local government elections but still remain illegal settlers. Hurungwe therefore exhibits all the characteristics and problems of a frontier region in a state of siege.

While initially the people moved involuntarily either due to politics (Land Apportionment Act) or as victims of development (Construction of the Kariba Dam), the immediate pre-independence and subsequent post independence period have seen a new form of voluntary movement. These movements have either been systematic through state settlement programmes or spontaneous migration into the area and related parts of the Zambezi Valley (Derman, 1996) Inevitably, this influx has generated conflict on three fronts. Firstly between humans and the wildlife. These immigrants are moved to act as shields from wildlife and so are at the frontline of the struggle between man and nature. A second front is between the new settlers on the one hand and the locals.

A third undeclared and silent war of attrition rages between traditional leadership on the one hand and the rural district council on the other. An exploration of the dimensions of these conflicts will show how CAMPFIRE has played out as an arena for these struggles. Before looking at these struggles in the frontier, we consider first a background to CAMPFIRE in Hurungwe.

### **CAMPFIRE in Hurungwe**

Although Council declared Hurungwe full in 1987, it only set aside land in the frontier regions as wildlife zones and applied for appropriate authority status in 1991. This was after two years of 'public consultation'. For Hurungwe Rural District Council, beside the revenue to be gained from CAMPFIRE further motivation emanated from *'the realisation that the illegal creeping settlement and cultivation of these remote and rugged areas was a very unsustainable land use and thus CAMPFIRE was viewed as a better land use option in terms of income generation'* (**Hurungwe Rural District Council, 1999:2**).

As the planning and land authority in Hurungwe council was experiencing problems with illegal settlers. And clearly sought to use CAMPFIRE as a tool to keep them away. Council therefore hoped that once land had been declared CAMPFIRE, it would be up to the communities to keep it that way if they wished to maintain the benefits (Bird, 1996). A total of 8 wards participate in CAMPFIRE as producer wards in Hurungwe. Two of the wards only joined in 1998 following construction of the Magunje Dam, which has brought prospects for tourism activities.

## **CAMPFIRE Institutional Arrangements**

CAMPFIRE in Hurungwe (as is the case in most districts) has created its own structures parallel to the sub-national administration and planning structures as stated in the Prime Ministerial Directive of 28 February 1984. This directive sought to :

*‘ define the administrative structure at provincial and district level and the relationships and channels of communication between all the participants in development at provincial and district level in-order to achieve the coordinated development of provinces and districts in Zimbabwe’.*

(Government of Zimbabwe, 1984: 1). Its effect was the establishment of decentralised planning and administration structures that for the first time included the village level institutions. Figure 1 shows the tiers of sub-national administration and planning that resulted from this directive. Development initiatives emanate from the lowest tiers of the structure in a bottom up manner.

From district level upwards however, the technocrats played a more prominent role. The structure was meant to usher in participatory development. In Hurungwe, as is the case in all CAMPFIRE Districts, operates its own parallel structure that attempts to interact as much as possible with the general local government planning and administration structure announced in 1984. We shall look at the effect of this on CAMPFIRE in later sections suffice to say its exclusion of traditional institutions has created a lot of the problems it faces today. In Hurungwe, the CAMPFIRE Unit employs a Coordinator who reports to the RDC. CAMPFIRE. Accounts are integrated into the district accounts although they operate a separate account. The CAMPFIRE coordinator works with the various committees at all levels. The Unit also employs some full time game scouts and support staff. Some resource monitors who are deployed at village level are also engaged as watchdogs.



**Figure 1 Local Government Planning and Administration Structure after February 1984**

<b>Unit</b>	<b>Institution &amp; functions</b>	<b>Participants</b>	<b>CAMPFIRE</b>
Village (100Households -1000 people)	Village Development Committee. (VIDCO) Plans Development at Village level through Various committees and reports to the WADCO through its VIDCO Chairman	Members are elected by other villagers. The rule is that there should be at least a woman and a youth. Central government extension staff at this level advise the VIDCO	Village Campfire Sub-Committee (6 members elected) Sub-Committee
Ward At least 6 villages (6000 people)	Ward Development Committee.(WADCO) Coordination of Village Plans and production of Ward level plans. It Reports to the DDC through its local Councilors who chairs it.	Normally consists of VIDCO chairmen and is chaired by the elected local councilor. Central government extension staff at this level also advise the WADCO is chaired by the councilor	Ward Campfire Each village-sub Committee sends a representative
District (All wards)	District Development Committee. (DDC) Co-ordination of ward level plans and production of District plan. Reports to the PDC through the District administrator who chairs it.	Line ministry representatives, local councillors, representatives of NGO's. Local Chief	District Campfire Sub-Committee Council Chairman and his Vice, Local Councilor, one rep from each ward Sub-Committee Council CEO Relevant members of the DDC
Province (all districts)	Provincial development committee. (PDC) Coordination of district Planning. Produces Provincial annual and five Year plan. Chaired by the Provincial administrator	Line ministry heads at province, heads of parastatals and other development agencies.	
National (All provinces)	Ministry of Local Government Rural and Urban Development (MLGRUD). Receives Provincial plans and Submits them to the Ministry of finance for funding	National Planning Agency RDC Local Government Section	CAMPFIRE Assn. Board,

## CAMPFIRE Revenue in Hurungwe

For close to ten years now, CAMPFIRE has been giving dividends to local communities according to the performance of the wards. To date close to Z\$5 million has been disbursed to the communities. *Table 1* shows the revenue performance of the CAMPFIRE programme in Hurungwe. The table shows the actual disbursement of funds to the producer wards.

**Table 1 Revenue generated by some producer wards in Hurungwe (1992-1999) in Z\$**

Ward Name	Revenue 1992 (5.5)	Revenue 1993 (6.9)	Revenue 1994 (8.4)	Revenue 1995 (9.3)	Revenue 1996 (10.8)	Revenue 1997 (11.9)	Revenue 1998 (38.3)	Revenue 1999 (48.2)	Total Since 1992
7 Nyamakate	103 578 (18 832)	98 138 (14 223)	171 889 (20 463)	223 941 (24 080)	192 580 (17 831)	200 406 (16 841)	714,976 (18 668)	715,425 (14 843)	<b>2 420943</b> <b>(145 781)</b>
8a Chundu	213 349 (38 791)	188 007 (27 248)	137 239 (16 338)	207 929 (22 358)	202 278 (18 729)	185 292 (15 571)	337,332 (8808)	503,344 (10 443)	<b>1 974770</b> <b>(158 286)</b>
8b Karuru	28 257 (5 138)	42 840 (6 209)	92 820 (11 050)	38 952 (4 188)	31 238 (2 892)	2646 (222)	29 999 (783)	87 000 (1814)	<b>353752</b> <b>(32 296)</b>
9 Kazangarare	68 299 (12 418)	104 443 (15 137)	137 687 (16 391)	94 251 (10 135)	108 496 (10 046)	132 269 (11 115)	233,900 (6107)	232,452 (4823)	<b>1 111797</b> <b>(86 172)</b>
13 Chidamoyo	3 257 (592)	6 000 (870)	1 000 (119)	2 500 (269)	1 600 (148)	1 000 (84)	8,625 (225)	27,360 (568)	<b>51342</b> <b>(2875)</b>
15 Rengwe	38 957 (7 083)	12 800 (1 855)	95 200 (11 333)	51 757 (5565)	64 750 (5995)	45 062 (4543)	129,088 (3370)	220,400 (4573)	<b>657654</b> <b>(44 317)</b>
16 Nyaodza	8 730 (1587)	28 275 (4098)	43 689 (5201)	45 166 (4857)	23 023 (2132)	38 191 (3209)	255,025 (6659)	313,139 (6497)	<b>755238</b> <b>(34 240)</b>
<b>Total</b>	<b>464 427</b> <b>(84 730)</b>	<b>480 503</b> <b>(69 638)</b>	<b>679 524</b> <b>(80 896)</b>	<b>664 496</b> <b>(71 451)</b>	<b>623 365</b> <b>(57 719)</b>	<b>604 866</b> <b>(50 829)</b>	<b>1 740945</b> <b>(44 620)</b>	<b>2 099120</b> <b>(43561)</b>	<b>7 357246</b> <b>(503 444)</b>

Source: Hurungwe RDC CAMPFIRE Reports

*In brackets : US\$ equivalent for that year*

A closer look at **Table 1** shows fluctuations in the undiscounted total revenue earned since 1993. What is also apparent is the variability of earnings among the producer wards with Chidamoyo earning consistently the least amounts. Nyamakate Chundu and Kazangarare perform consistently well. The wards that border large game populations harvest more. This is true for the resettlement ward of Nyamakate and Chundu. Location is therefore has everything to do with the volume of earnings. The link between the earnings and the macro-economic environment is also apparent. The slide of the Z\$ over major currencies has meant increased earnings in local currency and significantly cushioned the programme from inflation induced decline. This is largely related to the fact that most of the transactions are being done in foreign currency.

This factor therefore links the programme's fate to the global economy. A deterioration in the political environment for example was at the time of the field work reported to be affecting the business as most of the foreign hunters who pay in foreign currency cancelled their trips. A slump in earnings was therefore predicted.

### Costs Vs Benefits

Although the cash benefits reflected in Table 1 seem substantial, the extent to which CAMPFIRE is able to offset the damage of wildlife in Hurungwe is however debatable. A look at the undiscounted streams of cash benefits for two of the wards for which data are available will perhaps shed some light. Table 2 shows some of the recorded crop damage in the two producer wards.

**Table 2 Value of Crop damage for wards 13 and 15 (1992-March 1999)**

225 tones of Maize @ Z\$2 400/tonne	Z\$945 000
100 000kg of cotton @ Z\$14/kg	Z\$400 000
Sunflower 40 tonnes @ Z\$2 000/tonne	Z\$80 000
Groundnuts 15tonnes @ Z\$5000/tonne	Z\$75 000
<b>Total Value of damage</b>	<b>Z\$1 500 000</b>
16 people have been killed and 15 injured over the seven-year period	

**Total benefits for the two wards 1992-1999 Z\$708 966 (47 192)**

Source: Hurungwe RDC CAMPFIRE Unit

It is apparent from Table 2 that at present (at least for the two wards) CAMPFIRE has not provided enough cash returns to the communities of the two wards. This may explain why there has been a gradual shift from individual payments to community projects that give a greater flag effect to CAMPFIRE and can easily be the rallying point in discussing and advocating wildlife policies in future. The inadequate earnings while being related to animal off-take however also raise the question of how the benefits of the whole CAMPFIRE industry are distributed. While the council only gives communities what has been earned, there is growing evidence that the benefits are skewed in favour of the Safari Operator contracted to market the animals. Patel (1997:12) has shown that a disproportionately high amount goes to the Safari Operators.

In the worst case scenario at present, 89.1 per cent of the gross revenue goes to the Safari operators with the council and communities taking 5.4 per cent equally. In the best case scenario, 69 per cent of

the gross revenue accrues to the Safari Operator while council and communities take 15.5 per cent each presently.

It could therefore be said that the communities who are at the receiving end of the wildlife/human confrontation do not seem to be getting sufficient revenue to offset their losses and perhaps begin to invest more resources into the program. Further questions relate to how much tax council extracts from the earnings. Table 3 shows typical sharing arrangements for two of the years.

<b>Year</b>	<b>Total Income</b>	<b>Ward Dividends</b>	<b>Wildlife Mgt</b>	<b>Council Levy</b>	<b>Other</b>	<b>Unallocated</b>	<b>Total Expenditure</b>
<b>1998</b>	3557895	1678945	761173	503685	414092	200000	3357895
<b>1999</b>	5261274	3212120	1035611	603635	372871	37036	5224237

*All figures in Z\$*  
*NB Table includes figures for all the 8 wards*  
*Source: Hurungwe RDC CAMPFIRE Records*

What is clear is that a significant amount of CAMPFIRE earnings are taken by the high overhead costs. CAMPFIRE guidelines indicate that councils should give at least 50 per cent of the earnings to the communities by June every year. With declining government grants however, there is always the temptation to give less and progressively late. In the case of Hurungwe Rural District Council for example, in 1997 of the Z\$1 209 273 earned Z\$603 866 (49.9%) was disbursed as ward dividends, Z\$182 164 (15.1%) was allocated as the RDC levy, Z\$283 524 (23.4%) for district administration, and Z\$139 719 (11.6%) as National Parks and Wildlife Management Fund fees (ZimTrust 1999:4). This example while not confirming a generalised pattern of shortchanging the community, shows that this is a practice that can occur easily.

Late disbursement of funds together with misappropriation of funds are further problems that affect the dividends payments to local communities (ZIMTRUST 1999; Patel, 1997). In Hurungwe however, there has not been any recorded cases of misappropriation of the CAMPFIRE funds, yet.

### **Use of the Revenue Generated from CAMPFIRE by the Communities.**

A look at Table 4 shows that although initially the communities were keen to distribute cash among the households, tacit government pressure and increasing awareness have seen a shift towards community projects.

This to a larger extent has led to a significant decline in the direct impact of CAMPFIRE proceeds on household level benefits, particularly household incomes. Indirectly however, the investment in human capital enhancement projects like health and education will have long-term benefits. Whether the community with pressing needs at household level sees this long-term perspective is debatable. What is clear however is that as the project benefits have moved from individual household to community level, there seems to be feelings that perhaps they are doing what government and council taxes should be doing. A further interesting observation is that, because the community is not directly reinvesting in the CAMPFIRE project, there does not seem to be any real feeling that wildlife management is the future. Donor agencies and in particular USAID which has given close to US\$3 to date seem to be doing most of the capital investments into CAMPFIRE itself.

The majority of the community investments are in areas that are in direct competition with that very programme. For example investments in dip tanks and weirs reveal an implied desire to improve the cattle economy. This observation tends to contradict widely accepted views that communities view wildlife as being more profitable and as the future. Similarly, the investment in tractors and accompanying road construction and ploughing equipment in essence undermines the romanticisation of wildlife as an alternative to increased human settlement and agriculture. The tractors have actually been very useful in road construction and helping the farmers in field preparation.

**Table 4 Utilisation of Cash Benefits from CAMPFIRE (1992-1997)**

Ward	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997
7	Cash Z\$382/ household	Cash Zs880/ Household. Repairs on School buildings and Bore holes	Nyamakate Secondary School construction Building pre- school	Deposit on tractors and equipment. Ongoing work on Secondary School	Installments for tractors & equipment. Ongoing work on Secondary School	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment.
8a	Cash Z\$224/ Household Deposit for Grinding mill	Cash Z\$102/ Household. Paid off grinding mill. Donations to 6 schools.	Continued assistance to 6 schools. Repair of 7 bore holes in vidco1	Deposit on tractors and equipment. Donations to schools in the ward	Installments for tractors & equipment. Built shelter for expectant mothers at Chitindiva	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment. Built Weir
8b	Deposit for a grinding mill. Assisted local School	Paid off grinding mill. Assistance to local school Saving for local Clinic	Saving for local clinic	Deposit on tractors and equipment Saving for local clinic	Installments for tractors & equipment. Started to build local clinic	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment Continued work on local clinic
9	Cash Z\$70/ Household Chicken Project Painted local Clinic	Cash Z\$50/ Household. Assisted local school. Completed dip tank. Started work on 3 houses for clinic	Completed work on clinic houses Built pre- school	Deposit on tractors and equipment. Assisted local school. Began work on another dip tank	Installments for tractors & equipment. Continued work on dip tank	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment. Assisted local school. Work on dip tank continued
13	Bee keeping project	Assisted 2 primary schools. Began maize trading project	No projects	Deposit on tractors and equipment	Installments for tractors & equipment	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment
15	Bee Keeping project Dip tank construction	Fish project Continued work on dip tank	Dip tank construction continued. Assisted 6 schools in ward	Deposit on tractors and equipment. Construction of 6 weir dams began	Installments for tractors & equipment Construction of 6 weir dams continued	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment Assistance to local school
16	Assisted 8 local schools	Built blair toilets for local school	Assisted 7 schools in ward	Deposit on tractors and equipment	Installments for tractors & equipment	Last installment in purchase of tractors and equipment

Source: Hurungwe Rural District Council Campfire Unit records

Fieldwork in the frontier region shows that the areas is significantly much more accessible now than was the case before. While this may be beneficial to the communities, the hunter and his clients, increased accessibility in frontier regions has been known to accelerate the rate of in-migration. Making the frontier region more habitable through CAMPFIRE investments would therefore present an interesting irony than in seeking to show the benefits of the program its demise could be initiated. Some of the frontier wards that have seen heavy in-migration since 1980 and therefore have a large number of 'illegal settlers' have not given cash dividends. Instead they opted for community projects. What seems apparent is that in some cases it is impractical to come up with a politically correct list of legal settlers. Most of the people who are deemed illegal settlers have been given recognition by the *Sabhukus* and at the local level form part and parcel of activities. Leaving them out of community benefits of CAMPFIRE would therefore destroy the community cohesion and in a sense undermine the anti-poaching activities.

It would therefore appear that these problem wards have in essence adopted a strategy of minimising their maximum losses by going for community projects that would not exclude certain groups. Council may not necessarily agree with this position because it had hoped that through sharing of benefits, the illegal settlers could be flushed out (Bird 1996). But how has this scenario of conflict emerged and what options could be pursued for its successful resolution?. The next section addresses itself to some of these issues.

### **CAMPFIRE as the Theatre for Conflict between Traditional and Modern Institutions.**

The administration and planning system that emerged from the structure depicted in Figure 1 with regards wildlife management did not pay due regard to the traditional structures in existence in most areas. Ranger (1985) and Kriger (1996) have argued that this was largely a consequence of the role of the traditional chiefs during the civil war in the 1970's. They formed part of what Mamdani (1997) has termed decentralised despotism. This referred in part to how they were used as an indirect way of governance by the successive pre-independence governments. The traditional chiefs were therefore seen as an embodiment of the settler administration system that the nationalist guerrillas had been fighting. At independence, although tacit tolerance was given to the traditional institutions, there was always mistrust of these institutions (Ranger, 1995). The fact that they were not electable positions meant that in the new democracy a rethink of their role in governance structures was necessary.

After independence in 1980 the traditional institutions however continued to function formally and parallel to the new structures. This became one of the main sources of friction at the local level and as has been shown with regards to CAMPFIRE, also polarised development institutions at the local level. Although the chiefs were recognised as traditional leaders through the Chiefs and Headmen Act (Chapter 29) of 1982 their most important function as the land authority had been given to the District Councils. Their involvement in development and council affairs was also largely ceremonial. In fact, they remained ex-officio members of the district councils till 1993 when government empowered the Minister of Local Government to appoint up to three of them as councilors in their own right in each council area. This progressive empowerment of the chiefs can be used to argue that the chiefs were becoming more and more acceptable to government. Having developed this political constituency, and were being seen increasingly as more confident and could therefore challenge the politically elected councilors.

For CAMPFIRE, it could be argued that traditional institutions may have been sidelined largely for four reasons. First, traditional institutions were seen as colonial imprints on the rural landscape. This in part stemmed from their role as extensions of the settler administration during the war of liberation. Secondly traditional institutions were seen as undemocratic as the leaders are appointed rather than elected. It was therefore seen as preferable to devolution wildlife management to an elected council that was seen as accountable to the electorate. A fourth reason could be related to the soured relations between most producer communities and the Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management over 'illegal' consumptive utilization of park resources. As a result of this, there was always suspicion within the ranks of CAMPFIRE originators both within and outside the bureaucracy that these were the very institutions that had failed to stem wildlife poaching. Whatever reasons for this, the resultant conflict created problems as the sabhukus continued to allocate land in areas that were at times reserved for wildlife and related development programmes. While council as the planning authority sought to enforce a land use regime defined through its development plans, the sabhukus largely sidelined in the planning process, implemented their own vernacular plans.

### **Struggle for Hegemony: Sabhukus, Land Allocation and Council Programmes**

Until 1982 when the District Councils came into being and the Communal Lands Act was passed, land affairs at a local level remained the responsibility of traditional leadership. In the case of Hurungwe, the delineation officer had this to say in 1968:



*'The chief is the overall land authority for his nyika (area). Within the nyika the various masadunhu (headmen) are delegated land authorities for their dunhus (sub-region), always however with the understanding that they must refer to the chief as the ultimate authority on matters of dispute or where they are not sure of the law. A sadunhu would therefore have authority to allocate land to newcomers, if he were sure that this was in accordance with the general feeling of the nyika as enunciated by the chief. If however it was his understanding that the chief and the people only accepted people in special circumstances, then his approval would have to be sanctioned by the chief. In practice, the chief would then fall in with the wishes of his sadunhu where ever practicable'*

***Delineation Commission Report for Urungwe District.(1968: 1)***

Based on this description, it can be seen that traditional institutions have historically been in charge of land allocation at the local level and the colonial administration was content to keep it that way as it reduced administrative costs. That is how Hurungwe by and large has been populated. Berry (1993) has coined the phrase 'hegemony on a shoe string' to reflect the practice among colonial administrators to cut the administrative costs of colonial rule. Traditions die-hard. Although the pressure of land has increased, fieldwork in Hurungwe reveals not much deviation from the above description save for the need to refer the prospective settler to the council that now has the final say. While in actual fact council is the land authority, the traditional institutions has remained in tact and operating parallel to the newly established structure since 1984. Although they had been legally emasculated by the Chiefs and Headmen's Act of 1982 traditional institutions continued to command more respect and in most instances prevailed over the elected leadership. It was often the case in Hurungwe that a Sabhuku's meeting was well attended while the VIDCO chairman had to struggle to raise a quorum. Real power and respect never left the traditional institutions.

By aligning itself closely with the democratic structures, CAMPFIRE has therefore indirectly joined the struggle on the side of modern institutions in Hurungwe. Although there is a ritualised relationship that even sees the traditional chiefs commissioning CAMPFIRE projects, there is no hiding that deeper inner feelings are averse to ceding land to wildlife particularly in the absence of significant benefit streams. In the case of Hurungwe this came out in a group discussion with a selection of traditional leadership. CAMPFIRE came up as part of the whole discourse of development in Hurungwe and how people are made to pay the sacrifice for benefits that are

accruing to others. This is how it was put. We quote directly from the verbatim translation of the transcript.

*If electricity and tourism was the reason for our removal from Gova (Mana Pools Area) should it then be passing over our heads on its way to the city yet we the evictees don't have the electricity...Further, we don't get to benefit even from the animals there (Mana Pools) and here (Rengwe) because we don't control them. We don't get anything, there is no case for us. (CAMPFIRE) Together with the Safari Operator all they do is to enrich the council. Even to eat the meat from the animals we are not allowed- even to kill three bulls (of elephant) we need for our ancestral spirits we can't. When we get the meat it is from animals that been have been shot by hunters not us. Only the rich from abroad are allowed to hunt, we are not allowed. Now they are talking of further fences to stop our cattle from going to the Sanyati (river) all in the name of animals. Those who are eating (deriving benefits) are those that are not living with these animals- electricity is enjoyed by people like you at the university who have not paid the price for it. Others like (name mentioned) are now millionaires from these animals yet we still have nothing to show for all this trouble. (Excepts from an interview transcript with traditional leadership in Rengwe Communal lands October 2000)in brackets my additions*

This transcript reveals the deep feeling that is secretly held but only occasionally let out to emphasize displeasure with what is seen as cleverly disguised resource alienation. What is clear is that by not actively involving the powerful traditional institution in major decision-making in CAMPFIRE, there was no direct incentive for them to stop allocating land, a major input of the CAMPFIRE programme. The council is decidedly pro-conservation in a bio-centric way but also has its sights on the revenue from wildlife. With the state cutting support to councils, revenue generation is of paramount importance and so there are benefits to be made from limiting further human settlement in CAMPFIRE areas.

As a planning authority the only way to exercise its development control function is through control who goes in to settle where. Its duty is also to define land use and systematically intervene where clashes occur. But pressed for cash to finance its overheads and lend credence to its developmental role, the cash from CAMPFIRE is too tempting to leave alone.

*Sabhukus* are passionately pro-development by populating the frontier and driving back the ‘wild animals. The revenue to be earned from CAMPFIRE does not fall directly under their control. People need more land for agriculture. An area that is full of wildlife if under-developed. The psyche is geared toward giving migrants land as this drove the wilderness further from their areas while at the same time increasing the number of subjects. For the chiefs, the major benefit is largely related to having more subjects. Although it is at times felt that traditional leadership gets kickbacks from potential migrants, I would argue that this may be occurring in isolated incidents as most of them have nothing to show for it. Given the numbers involved if they corruptly charged for land, most would have substantial wealth to display. The fear for CAMPFIRE however is that the more land it loses to arable agriculture the more difficult it becomes for it to be viable. It has been suggested that high population densities are detrimental to large game habitats in Africa especially for elephants that provide 90 per cent of CAMPFIRE revenue. Estimates show that extinction of the elephant is a possibility at 19.9 pp/km<sup>2</sup> (Rihoy 1992:7). In Hurungwe, this may already have been breached and so each new settler threatens this already delicate balance.

#### **Of Hostile Settlers and Animal Friendly Locals: Changing Identities and Citizenship Rights**

A local level labeling process that is gaining wider circulation (see Murombedzi, 2000; Dzingirai 1998; Bird, 1996; Derman, 1996) is based on perceiving the recent settlers as being aggressive to wildlife. They are seen to report and complain more aggressively of wildlife damage. This has polarised the community in a way that plays the ‘animal friendly’ indigenous groups and the ‘aggressively anti-wildlife’ settlers or ‘Mavhitori’ (people from Fort Victoria now Masvingo Province) as they are popularly termed. Field evidence from Hurungwe suggested that this was a deliberate ‘anti-settler’ construction from wildlife advocacy coalitions seeking to stem the threat of uncontrolled human migration to the lucrative wildlife industry. Unfortunately this ‘political labeling’ process has not helped local relations between the two groups. Field evidence shows that the ‘Mavhitori’ migrants do more reporting because in the majority of cases they are located on the frontier and therefore bear the brunt of wildlife damage. The cruel irony is that the settlers have occupied prime wildlife areas a factor that makes them part of the ‘producer community’ and hence entitled to benefits of CAMPFIRE. But, this raises the political stakes. As ‘illegal’ settlers should they be enjoying the CAMPFIRE proceeds at all? After all they are illegal settlers and do not have the magical ‘38’ on their *ID’s* (*all legal residents of Hurungwe have national citizen registration*

*numbers prefixed with 38*). The ‘illegal settlers’ negative feelings are therefore generated by policies that appear to endear themselves to wildlife at the expense of people.

The issue of obtaining ‘Hurungwe’ citizenship is however complicated by the fact that the migrants through sheer strength of numbers are important ‘political’ capital and hence potential kingmakers. It is therefore not surprising that the issue of ‘identity takes a back seat during local elections. As part of their survival strategy the ‘migrants’ have realized this potential bargaining chip and use it to full effect often gaining access to powerful political brokers with ease. In 2000 they were able to successfully field a councilor a factor that has changed their political fortunes. In official circles there is talk of the ‘squatters’ having ‘sponsored’ a councilor. This could prove to be a turning point in their fortunes as they will now have political voice in council. In addition to the fact that the group now have a councilor from among them, the politically charged atmosphere over land is working to the migrants favour since any council seen evicting people even squatters could be deemed hostile to the landless. This is particularly true if the people are being evicted in the name of animals. In fact, the illegal settlers have actually provided local politicians fighting for political survival with crucial political capital. They are evidence of and justification for extreme land hunger. It would appear from this discussion that CAMPFIRE will have to come up with innovative options to try and solve some of the issues raised in the discussion so far. We now turn to some of the options available and the implications of some recent developments.

### **Mending the Fences (Unsuccessfully?)**

Three main options appear to be open depending on how the problem has been defined. These range from re-centralisation of wildlife management, further devolution of wildlife stewardship to villages as currently constituted to giving appropriate authority to the traditional institutions more. We look at these in turn below

#### **Recentralisation.**

Not many discussions have considered this option so far as it appears to run contra to the decentralisation and devolved governance bandwagon. I would however like to concede that this is easily a viable option that can be used as a fall back position should the councils fails to manage resources according to the state’s expectation. This is implied in the issuance of appropriate authority that can be withdrawn at the discretion of the state. Although no council has lost

appropriate authority yet, the letter of award states clearly that the relevant ministry retains the power to recall. Evidence is beginning to emerge that owing to the many failings of the councils, government will increasingly be asked to step in. By 1999 three Rural District Councils (two of them CAMPFIRE districts) were under judicial management after failing competently run their affairs. It is not an exaggeration to say with a declining economy these three councils will not be the last. So, while scenario one looks unreasonable, it is always the escape hatch from the failings of devolved governance.

Re-centralisation would mean that the Department of National Parks and Wildlife management takes back its role as custodian of wildlife. Revenue would then accrue to the newly created Wildlife Fund which could still give back to the communities a portion of this. This new Wildlife Fund could equally run CAMPFIRE albeit in a non-representative way. The only difference is that instead of the Councils running CAMPFIRE, it would be the Wildlife Fund that could easily take over the current campfire institutions. This approach is actually what currently obtains with regards to services offered by other central government line ministries that operate to village level like Agritex. The major problems with this scenario is that it is potentially retrogressive and could send wildlife management back to the days of fortress conservation.

### **Further Devolution**

If the issues are defined in terms of insufficient devolution of authority, the suggestion has always been to decentralise further. Murphree (1994) and Murombedzi (1997; 2000; 2003) have argued passionately for this option. This would mean that councils devolve further the management responsibility to even lower spatial units particularly the ward. This they argue would be the true community based management as opposed to the current council based devolved governance system. The argument derives largely from perception of the central state and local government as an interest based institution. The interests dominating the state and council may not necessarily work for the people hence the need to devolve wildlife to lower levels close to the people so that they make the crucial decisions. The position however assumes that common interests exist at the local level. Evidence from Hurungwe would indicate that because of the labeling process, such an approach may further polarise the community. Further, the instability in the local level institutions implies that at present there is no capacity for further devolution. Even the current campfire institutional builder (ZIMTRUST) concede that although they have been working on the institutions


for the past eight and in some cases ten years, there is a high turnover in the committees with each national and council election that they literally have to start again after election.

### **Integrating Traditional Authority With Devolved Governance Structures**

This seems to be the option preferred by the Zimbabwe government and is in its second year of implementation. In 1994 the government commission of inquiry into Land Tenure Systems (The Rukuni Commission) made a number of key recommendations to address some of the problems of authority in communal areas. It recommended that ward boundaries coincide with chieftainship areas and that ward committees involve both traditional and local elected leadership to reduce conflict. It further advocated for making village level institutions accountable for natural resources found in their area. This would effectively make them land, water and natural resources boards. The Rukuni Commission also recommended replacing VIDCOs with traditional villages run by traditional leaders with the assistance of a village assembly to which all adult would members belong (GoZ, 1994). Cabinet approval for the changes was granted in 1995.

It was not until April 1999 however that through the Traditional Leaders Act, the traditional institution embodied in the chief assumed a developmental role in addition to the judicial one. A new formal structure with legal status emerged at sub-district level to replace the old one. Under the new dispensation, the traditional village will consist of 20 households (GoZ,2000; 12).

Figure 2 shows the new institution as pronounced in the Traditional Leaders Act. It is still unclear whether this will replace eventually the old structures although it is probably fair to say that the act formalises what has been practice all along.



Village CAMPFIRE Sub-Committee  
(Village CAMPFIRE Chairman)

*Village 'Dare'*  
(*sabhuku*)

Village Assembly  
↑  
Individual household

The Traditional Leaders Act gives formal recognition to the division of the country into chieftainship that had been introduced during the pre-independence era. The Ministry of Local Government and National Housing outlines the new functions of Chiefs as:

- a) Preventing any unauthorized settlement or use of land' the RDC still however remain the land authority'
- b) Adjudicating in and resolving disputes relating to land'
- c) Maintaining up to date registers of villages and their inhabitants
- d) Overseeing the collection by village heads of levies, taxes, rates and charges payable in terms of the RDC Act.
- e) Ensuring that the land and other natural resources are used and exploited in terms of the law

Table 5 compares the new structure with the old. It is apparent that the new village is significantly smaller. The de-emphasis on the role of technocrats is also worth noting. The line ministry officials have no formal role in the deliberations of the assemblies. They are give advisory roles.

Structures under PM'S Directive	Structures Under The Traditional Leaders'Act
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<p><b>Unit Village</b> (100Households -1000 people)</p>	<p><b>Institution &amp; functions</b> Village Development Committee. (VIDCO) Members are elected by other villagers. The rule is that there should be at least a woman and a youth. Plans Development at village level through various committees. Central government extension staff at this level advise the VIDCO. and reports to the WADCO through its VIDCO Chairman</p>	<p><b>Unit Village</b> 20 households (200 people)</p>	<p><b>Institutions and Function</b> Village Assembly consisting of all adult members(male and female) of the village. This elects members of the dare/inkundla.(committee). Kraalheads/village heads appointed by headman is the head of the Dare. Members of the traditional village have formal perpetual usufruct rights (not ownership) over land and natural resources. Records all transactions of land subdivision, ownership, inheritance at lodge them with the District Administrator.</p>
<p><b>Ward</b> At least 6 villages</p>	<p>Ward Development Committee. (WADCO). Normally consists of VIDCO chairmen and is chaired by local councillor. Coordination of village plans and production of ward level plans with the assistance of the central government extension staff at ward level. Reports to the DDC through its local councillors who chairs it.</p>	<p><b>Ward</b> Is equivalent to chieftainship or headman area</p>	<p>Headed by the chief/headman, this will consist of all the villages in a chieftainship area. All kraalheads are part of the ward assembly. Chief's dare is made up of appointed village heads. Civil servants are ex-officio members of the dare to advise. Elected councillor also part of the dare.</p>

Close reading of the functions of the chiefs under the new act indicates that the Councils remain the land authority but can now legally enlist the support of the Chiefs in enforcing the land regulations. Further, the Chiefs' will now be on a government payroll. This elevates them from the previous position when they would get allowances. The new act therefore gives prominence to an institution whose office is not electable but inherited. It remains to be seen how this will work out in practice but already increased tension is evident between the traditional leadership and the elected officials. Heightened tension between the two is affecting the operations of CAMPFIRE in some districts as: 'it is not clear who has the overall say as the powers are vested in both the traditional and local government institutions' (ZimTrust, 1999: 16)

An outburst from an elected official during a village meeting summed up the tension. The visibly enraged official told the gathering *'you don't know what you are doing or who you report to on development matters so you always suffer longer. Who deals with development here me or the chief? Who goes to council to ask for the technicians to come me or the chief? Who goes to the council more often me or the chief? Who does not know the answer to this? You people should stop playing*



*games you hear'* (Fieldwork notes, 2000). The villagers had informed the councilor that they had communicated to the chief through their Sabhuku that the CAMPFIRE borehole had broken down. The team later gathered that although the message had reached the councilor, he was not happy to take the word from the chief. It would therefore appear that tension between local government institutions and traditional leadership at sub-district level remains unresolved. The fact that chiefs are now paid much more and yet it's the councilors who do most of the work does not help matters in the relations. But what options exit at present? We now turn to a discussion of these in relation to CAMPFIRE.

### **Conclusion**

This discussion has shown that although benefits have been accruing to communities in Hurungwe these have not been in sufficient streams to offset the losses suffered by the communities. The industry would have to do more and make if ever it is to be seen as an alternative to arable agriculture and the cattle economy. Re-aligning the profit sharing arrangements within the industry particularly with the Safari Operators who on the face of it get the bulk of the profits is a priority.

It has also been shown that there are some forms of investment from CAMPFIRE that inherently undermine its existence. An example of the tractor projects for ploughing and road construction is an example of such investments. It is apparent from these forms of investments that the participating wards look to CAMPFIRE What the paper has also attempted to argue is that the apparent schism between the pro-conservation and bio-centric council and the pro-development and anthropocentric traditional institutions could significantly undermine CAMPFIRE as more and more people are resettled in the wildlife areas.

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